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        <identifier>oai:kaetsu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000920</identifier>
        <datestamp>2023-06-19T09:20:21Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach</dc:title>
          <dc:title>Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach</dc:title>
          <dc:title>Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>加藤, 寛之</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Bubble</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Bayesian</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Conditional probability</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Ambiguity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Epsilon contamination</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Bubble</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Bayesian</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Conditional probability</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Ambiguity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Epsilon contamination</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>P(論文)</dc:description>
          <dc:description>This paper presents two players' equilibrium model in which bubbles of security prices occur in finite time even when both players know that the prices are bubbles. We firstly describe a Bayesian model with asymmetric information mainly based on Conlon (2004, Econometrica) and secondly extends it to non-Bayesian setting in which players cannot identify the true probability but a set of probabilities with ambiguity aversion employing epsilon contamination. We proved that in non-Bayesian approach asymmetry of information is not necessary for the existence of bubbles and that bubble prices rise more steeply than those in Bayesian.</dc:description>
          <dc:description>departmental bulletin paper</dc:description>
          <dc:date>2018-03-14</dc:date>
          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>嘉悦大学研究論集</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>2</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>60</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>43</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>53</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>KAETSU UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REVIEW</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>AA1171228X</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://kaetsu.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/920/files/Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach.pdf</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://kaetsu.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/920</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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