@article{oai:kaetsu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000920,
 author = {加藤, 寛之},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {嘉悦大学研究論集, KAETSU UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REVIEW},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {P(論文), This paper presents two players' equilibrium model in which bubbles of security prices occur in finite time even when both players know that the prices are bubbles. We firstly describe a Bayesian model with asymmetric information mainly based on Conlon (2004, Econometrica) and secondly extends it to non-Bayesian setting in which players cannot identify the true probability but a set of probabilities with ambiguity aversion employing epsilon contamination. We proved that in non-Bayesian approach asymmetry of information is not necessary for the existence of bubbles and that bubble prices rise more steeply than those in Bayesian.},
 pages = {43--53},
 title = {Finite Bubbles in a Non-Bayesian Approach},
 volume = {60},
 year = {2018}
}